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THE STRUCTURE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
LAW: IS RESTITUTION A RIGHT OR A
REMEDY?
Stephen A. Smith*
One difficulty facing anyone trying to understand the law of
unjust enrichment is that the relationship between two basic
categories of unjust enrichment rules is unclear. The first category is
comprised of rules that are directed at citizens and that set out the
circumstances in which the recipient of a benefit is under a legal duty
to return that benefit.' Rules describing when the recipient of a
mistaken payment is under a duty to return that payment fall into this
first category. The second category is comprised of rules that are
directed at courts and that set out the circumstances in which a court
may order that the recipient of a benefit do something for the
transferor of the benefit. Rules describing when a court may order
the recipient of a mistaken payment to pay a sum of money to the
payor fall into this second category. What is unclear about the
relationship between these two categories is whether the second
category adds anything substantive to the first category. According
to one view, dominant in England, the two categories of rules
collapse into one-at least in cases involving mistaken payments and
other defective transfers.2 This "direct enforcement" view regards
* Professor of Law, McGill University. Work on this Article was
supported by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research
Council of Canada. I am grateful also for research assistance provided by Finn
Makela.
1. "Unjust enrichment law" is understood in this Article as concerned
exclusively with cases involving defective transfers. The reason for adopting
this definition is explained below.
2. See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OxFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 28 (2000); see also Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 48-49 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) (arguing that the second category analysis is "superfluous"). But see Kit
Barker, Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies are
Right, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301, 320-22 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he order
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court orders to make restitution ("restitutionary orders") in such
cases as orders that a defendant perform her primary obligation.
3
Restitutionary orders in this view merely replicate the defendant's
original obligation to return the benefit.4 A second view, which finds
more support in American jurisprudence,5 regards the two categories
as distinct. This "remedial" view regards restitutionary orders as
orders that a defendant repair the harm caused by her wrongly failing
to perform her primary obligation.6  This Article asks which, if
either, of these views is correct. Is restitution a right or a remedy?
The answer to this question forms one part-a crucial one--of
any general explanation of unjust enrichment law. Let me explain.
A complete explanation of any legal rule or group of legal rules must
address both normative questions about the justification, if any, for
the rule(s) and analytic questions about the characteristic features of
the rule(s). Analytic questions can be further divided, at least in
respect of private law, according to whether they focus on rules that
set out citizens' primary legal obligations (e.g., the obligation to
perform a contract) or on rules that set out courts' responses to
claims based on those primary obligations (e.g., an order to pay a
sum of money). With respect to both primary obligations and
judicial responses, the relevant analytic questions are similar: (1)
what is the nature of the events that give rise to the
obligation/response? and (2) what is the content of the
replicates the content of the primary right, but this does not make it the same
thing.").
3. See Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, supra note 2, at 30.
4. See id. at 28.
5. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution distinguishes between "The
Right to Restitution" in part I and "Constructive Trusts and Analogous
Equitable Remedies" in part II, and within part I a distinction is drawn between
"Unjust Enrichment" in section 4 and "Remedies" in section 1. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION pt. I §§ 1, 4, pt. II (1937). In the
Restatement (Second) of Restitution remedies are given a separate chapter. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION ch. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
A particularly strong endorsement of the remedial view is seen in Justice
Scalia's opinion in Great-West Life v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213-14 (2002),
which is the subject of Tracy Thomas's article for this Symposium. See Tracy
A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1063
(2003).
6. See Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 213 (discussing that restitution at law
was viewed as reparation for breach rather than return of lost amounts).
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obligation/response? 7  The answers to the first set of analytic
questions establish whether the relevant primary obligation counts as
a contractual obligation, a tort law obligation, and so on. The
answers to the second set of analytic questions determine whether a
legal response counts as remedial, punitive, direct enforcement of a
primary obligation, and so on.
The question addressed in this Article-how should
restitutionary orders be classified-is an analytic question about one
category of judicial orders. That analytic questions generally are
important is, I trust, uncontroversial. Even scholars who might
purport to be interested solely in normative questions about law
cannot avoid taking a position on analytic questions of the sort
described above. To understand, from a normative perspective, why
rules of this kind and of that kind are needed, and then to determine
how to apply those rules effectively to the appropriate factual
scenarios, it is necessary to draw analytic distinctions between rules,
as well as between the kinds of events they are meant to deal with.
Normative thinking, like any other kind of thinking, involves
analytic categories: like cases should be decided alike. (And of
course the reverse is also true-analytic thinking involves normative
categories-as illustrated in this Article.)
Analytic work on judicial orders is particularly needed. Legal
scholars have long theorized about the classification of primary
obligations into contractual, tortious, and so on. Moreover, there is
significant consensus, as illustrated by the similar approaches taken
in leading textbooks in these fields, about what belongs in each of
these categories. With respect to judicial orders, the picture is quite
different. There is little consensus as to whether judicial orders are
7. Someone asking these questions with respect to primary contractual
obligations, for example, would consider first whether contracts are created by
promises, reliance-inducing statements, transfers of existing rights, or some
other event; and, second, whether contractual obligations are promissory
obligations, obligations to compensate for induced reliance, obligations to
respect property, or some other category of obligation. By contrast, someone
asking these questions with respect to a judicial response, say an order that a
defendant pay a sum of money, would consider first whether the response was
triggered by a wrong, a non-wrongful breach of duty, a threatened breach of
duty, or some other event; and, second, whether the legal response was an
order to pay a sum equal to the plaintiffs loss, pay a sum equal to the
defendant's gain, perform the relevant primary obligation, or perform some
other action.
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best studied separately from primary obligations. And when they are
studied separately, there is little consensus as to what are the
appropriate categories, let alone what should go into each of these
categories. 8 This lack of consensus is particularly evident, as I have
already indicated, with respect to restitutionary orders. It is part of
the reason lawyers are unsure even what to call this body of law:
"unjust enrichment" or "restitution."
The Article has three parts. Part I explains how I employ the
terms "direct enforcement orders," "remedial orders," and
"restitutionary orders" in this Article. The definitional inquiry is
necessary because the first term may not be familiar and because the
others terms, though familiar, are understood in a narrow sense in
this Article. Part II explains the preconditions for making direct
enforcement orders and remedial orders. This explanation, which
applies to judicial orders generally and not just to restitutionary
orders, turns on the conclusions of an essentially normative account
about why and when courts should directly enforce primary
obligations and why and when they should grant remedial orders.
Finally, in Part III, the question of whether restitutionary orders are
properly considered direct enforcement orders or remedial orders is
addressed in light of the conclusions from Part II and of the judicial
practices regarding such orders. My conclusion, which will
displease both those who think restitutionary orders are direct
enforcement orders and those who think they are remedial orders, is
that restitutionary orders can rightly be regarded as either remedial
orders or as direct enforcement orders. Sometimes they are the
former, sometimes the latter.
I. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
A. Direct Enforcement Orders and Remedial Orders
Both direct enforcement orders and remedial orders are judicial
orders that a defendant do or not do some action. With respect to
direct enforcement, that action is the performance of a primary legal
obligation or duty.9 Examples of primary legal obligations include
8. See B irks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, supra note 2, at 25-3 6.
9. I will use the terms "duty" and "obligation" interchangeably. The
distinction between "primary" rights and "remedial" or "secondary" rights
goes back, in the common law, to Austin. See John Austin, Lecture XLV Law
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duties not to injure others, duties to perform contracts, parents' duties
to support their children, and duties to pay taxes. These duties are
legal duties because they are articulated as such by law-making
bodies and because their actual or likely non-performance can give
rise to legal consequences. They are primary duties because they
arise not from breaching another duty, but from a "non-wrong" such
as entering the jurisdiction (in the case of the above tort duty), doing
a non-wrongful act (in the case of contractual duties and most duties
to pay tax), or attaining a certain status (in the case of duties to
support one's children). 10 Orders that a defendant refrain from
trespassing on a plaintiff's property or that a defendant respect a
contractual non-competition covenant are conventionally understood
as direct enforcement orders in the sense intended here.
The term "remedy" has a wide variety of meanings in legal
discourse, and the same is true of "remedial orders."'" In most law
schools, what I have defined as a "direct enforcement order" would
be taught in a course on Remedies. In this Article, I use "remedial
order" in a specific and narrow sense. Specifically, I mean a judicial
order designed to ensure that the defendant repair a harm or loss
caused to the plaintiff by the defendant's failure to perform a primary
obligation. Remedial orders are therefore compensatory orders. An
example of an order that would conventionally be understood as
remedial in this sense is an order that a defendant who was found to
have wrongfully caused the plaintiff a personal injury pay to the
plaintiff a monetary sum equivalent to the loss. Orders that cannot
be classified as remedial in this sense include punitive damages,
nominal damages, declarations, and injunctions to prohibit
continuing or anticipated torts.
The substantive reason for adopting this narrow definition of
remedial orders is that it matters whether judicial orders, including
orders to make restitution, are remedial in this sense. A distinct set
of principles (discussed below) governs the making of remedial
orders. Linguistically too, there is a reason for using the word
of Things-Its Main Divisions, in 2 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 760, 761-
62 (Verlag Detlev Auvermann KG, 5th ed.1972) (1885).
10. See id.
11. See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 21 (2d ed. 1993); Birks,
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, supra note 2, at 9-19.
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"remedy" in this narrow sense: this is the sense that corresponds to
the core of its ordinary, etymological, and legal meaning.12
B. Restitutionary Orders
The term "restitutionary order" is also used in a relatively
narrow sense in this Article. 13 A restitutionary order, as understood
here, is a judicial order that is made in response to a claim of
subtractive unjust enrichment and that requires the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff the value of the property that the defendant received
from the plaintiff.14  The standard example of subtractive unjust
enrichment is a mistaken transfer. Other examples include transfers
made under duress, under legal compulsion, by reason of necessity,
by persons lacking capacity, or on the basis of a failed
consideration.' 5 These are cases of "subtractive" unjust enrichment
because the defendant's enrichment is subtracted from the plaintiff's
assets. Judicial orders that do not here qualify as restitutionary
orders thus include, inter alia, an order that a defendant disgorge
profits made as a result of breaching a duty owed to the plaintiff
(restitution for wrongs) and orders requiring a defendant to pay a fair
sum for services performed by the defendant (quantum meruit).
My reasons for adopting a narrow definition of restitutionary
order are, again, substantive and linguistic. The substantive reason is
that it is far from clear that the same principles that apply to
instances of restitutionary orders in the narrow sense should apply to
restitution for wrongs, quantum meruit, and a variety of other
situations that are sometimes described as giving rise to
restitutionary orders. I share the view of many that, at a minimum,
12. See 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 584 (2d ed. 1989) ("remedy"
derived from Latin "to heal").
13. I note here that the conclusion to this Article-that restitutionary orders
are sometimes direct enforcement and sometimes remedial-suggests that the
term "restitutionary order" is sometimes a misnomer. When a (so-called)
restitutionary order is the direct enforcement of a primary duty (to make
restitution) the term is appropriate. But when a restitutionary order is a remedy
then it should be labeled as such or simply as "damages."
14. The defendant in such cases is also typically required to pay an award
or interest. I discuss the significance of interest awards in Part III. I also
discuss in Part III the significance of courts making proprietary awards, as they
sometimes do, in cases involving subtractive unjust enrichment.
15. See PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION chs.
VI-VIII (1985).
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cases of disgorgement and quantum meruit are neither about unjust
enrichment nor give rise to restitutionary orders. 16 But even if I am
wrong in this view, it seems prudent to begin our inquiry by focusing
on what is widely agreed to be the core case of a restitutionary order
in response to an unjust enrichment. Linguistically, confining
restitution to cases of subtractive unjust enrichment is consistent with
the etymology of "restitution," which lies in the idea of "restoration"
(rather than any notion of "handing over"), and with the ordinary
understanding of restitution as a "giving back.'
7
II. THE PRECONDITIONS FOR MAKING DIRECT ENFORCEMENT ORDERS
AND REMEDIAL ORDERS.
To determine whether a particular judicial order is a direct
enforcement order or a remedial order we need to know, inter alia,
the preconditions for making each order. If the preconditions for a
remedial order are not satisfied in cases in which restitutionary
orders are made, then restitutionary orders are not remedial. The
same is true for direct enforcement orders.
To determine the preconditions for direct enforcement orders
and remedial orders we need to know, in turn, why a court would
consider it appropriate to make either order. In other words, we need
a theory of the normative foundations of judicial orders, or at least of
the normative foundations of two kinds of judicial orders. A theory
of the normative foundations of judicial orders is one part of a theory
of the normative foundations of private law. Of course, it is not
possible to speak of "the" theory of the normative foundations of
private law-there is no single normative theory accepted by all, or
even a clear majority of, lawyers or scholars. But broadly speaking,
and leaving aside skeptical normative theories,' 8 normative theories
of private law generally regard private law as grounded in either
consequentialist or deontological moral foundations. I shall not
argue in favor of either of these views here. Instead, I will discuss
16. See, e.g., JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT: ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 21-44 (1991); J. E.
Penner, Basic Obligations, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 91-122
(Peter Birks ed., 1997); Samuel Stoljar, Unjust Enrichment and Unjust
Sacrifice, 50 MOD. L. REV. 603 (1987).
17. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 753.
18. Skeptical theories are theories that regard the law as having no
normative justification.
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the implications of each in respect of the preconditions for direct
enforcement and remedies.
A. Consequentialist Accounts of Direct Enforcement and Remedial
Orders
Consequentialist theories of private law, in the sense intended
here, explain private law on the ground that it encourages or requires
behaviour that has "good" consequences. Different consequentialist
theories define those consequences in different ways, but most
explain them in terms of some conception or aspect of human well-
being. The best known contemporary group of consequentialist
theories, "efficiency" theories, regard private law as promoting the
welfare, understood subjectively, of all members of society.' 9 For
the sake of convenience, I will adopt this model in the discussion that
follows, but my arguments apply equally to other instances of
consequentialist theories.
There are three main ways that a judicial order could be used to
promote welfare, and thus three possible roles for judicial orders in
efficiency-based normative theories. First, a court order could
directly require a person to behave in a way that increases societal
welfare. To take a simplified example, suppose that Ann comes to a
court complaining that John has in his possession a painting that he
took from her. Suppose further that Ann will obtain more welfare
from possessing the painting than John will. A court following this
first approach might simply order John to do the "welfare-
maximizing thing" and give Ann the painting.
The second way in which a court order might promote welfare is
by creating incentives that encourage people to act in future welfare-
maximizing ways. For example, an order to pay a sum of money to
the complainant might be regarded-and typically is regarded in
efficiency theories-as an incentive to encourage the defendant and
other citizens to act appropriately in the future. The possibility of a
similar order being made again operates as a stick for persons who,
in the future, are in the defendant's position, and as a carrot for
persons who, in the future, are in the plaintiff s position.
19. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101-54
(5th ed. 1998).
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Finally, and less studied, a court order might promote welfare by
establishing initial entitlements to property rights, to make it easier
for parties to act in welfare-maximizing ways in the future.2° The
setting of boundaries around intellectual property rights for example,
will make it easier for persons to engage in welfare-enhancing
exchanges of such rights in the future.
For our purposes, what is important about these three ways of
promoting welfare is that none is plausibly understood as a remedy-
i.e., none of them aim to repair a loss caused by the party subject to
the order. The first way-an order that a person behave in a certain
welfare-maximizing way-might be triggered by that person's
failure to behave appropriately in the past, but it cannot be regarded
as an attempt to repair the effects of that past behavior. The point of
the order is to require the defendant to perform an efficient action.
As such, it is probably best regarded as the direct enforcement of a
primary obligation.
2 1
Setting incentives for welfare-maximizing behavior (i.e., the
second way judicial orders can promote welfare identified above),
might support judicial orders that look like remedies to those who
think the law should provide remedies, but from the perspective of a
consequentialist theory, they are not remedies. Remedies are
retrospective; their purpose is to repair a loss that happened in the
past. Incentives, by contrast, are prospective; their purpose is to
encourage all citizens (and not just the plaintiff and defendant) to
behave in certain ways in the future. Incentives are neither remedial
nor direct enforcement.
The third way of promoting welfare, establishing initial
entitlements, is self-evidently neither remedial nor direct
enforcement.
The conclusion that consequentialist theories of law cannot
explain why courts acting on consequentialist grounds might make a
remedial order does not deny that such theories may explain the
content of the orders that non-consequentialists call "remedial"
orders. The usual consequentialist explanation is that such orders set
20. See id. at ch. 3.
21. I say "probably" because we cannot be sure without a consequentialist
account of direct enforcement on the table-which I do not provide.
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22useful incentives. Consequentialist theories may also be able to
explain why it might be useful for lawyers and courts to think that
what courts are doing is making remedial orders. The explanation
here would be to the effect that, in practice, courts will better achieve
the consequentialist aims of setting appropriate incentives if they
think they are ordering remedies than if they think they are trying to
set incentives.23 Nothing said here is meant to prove or disprove
these explanations. So far as this Article is concerned, the only claim
I make concerning consequentialist theories is that such theories
provide no reasons for remedial orders in the sense understood here.
Since an account of direct enforcement, which I assume
consequentialist theories can provide, 24 is not of much help by itself
if we are trying to compare direct enforcement with remedial orders,
consequentialist theories are of little help in answering the question I
have posed. Whether this conclusion should be regarded as an
illuminating argument for consequentialist theories or as one reason
for rejecting consequentialist theories is a question for another
article.
B. Deontological Theories: Introduction
Deontological theories of private law, in the sense intended here,
explain private law in terms of the intrinsic value-the intrinsic
rightness or wrongness-of actions rather than the consequences of
25those actions. So far as primary obligations are concerned, a
deontological explanation is typically framed in terms of individual
rights and duties. According to this "rights-based" view of private
law, which I will use as my model of a deontological theory,
citizens' primary obligations-to perform contracts, not to harm the
property or person of others, and so on-are grounded in the intrinsic
wrongness of harming a specified aspect of another's interests.
26
22. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REv. 967, 1032 (2001).
23. See, e.g., id. at 1028-38.
24. That account, however, is likely to suggest that direct enforcement
should play an extremely limited role. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Two
Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW 19 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
25. Two important examples are CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE
(1981) and ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
26. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 25, at 4.
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Thus, to commit the tort of trespass is wrong in this view because the
tortfeasor has unjustifiably infringed the victims' right to exclusive
use of her property, and it is wrong regardless of the consequences of
that action for social welfare or any other concept of social good.
The implications of adopting a deontological theory for
understanding judicial orders, and in particular for understanding
direct enforcement and remedial orders, are complex. If rights are
important then courts should not do anything that would infringe on
individuals' rights. Courts must respect the same primary
obligations that citizens must respect. But the importance of
respecting individual rights does not tell us what, if anything, courts
should do when individuals come to them with a "rights-based"
complaint. It is perfectly consistent with respecting rights, at least
when rights are understood in the individualist sense of this tradition,
for courts to do nothing in the face of actual or threatened rights-
infringements. The thief infringes his victim's rights, but a person
who fails to prevent a potential thief from stealing or who fails to
apprehend a successful thief does not infringe anyone's rights.
The concept of individual rights and duties used to explain
primary obligations in nearly all deontological theories is
insufficient, then, to explain judicial orders. A further normative
concept must be introduced. This is not a defect in deontological
theories. In contrast to consequentialist theories, which suppose that
the relevant concept of the good (e.g., welfare) can and should
provide a guide for all actions, it has never been supposed in
deontological theories that the concept of rights (or whatever else
accounts for primary legal obligations) provides a complete guide for
individual behavior, much less a complete guide for the state's
behavior.
The main limitation on the kind of account of judicial orders that
may be added to a deontological theory of private law is that such an
account must be consistent with the theory's explanation of primary
obligations (which I assume here is rights-based). The main
significance of this limitation, in turn, is that it precludes adopting a
consequentialist account of judicial orders. According to a
consequentialist account, courts may require that a defendant do
something, say pay a sum of money, in order to encourage other
persons to behave properly in the future. In principle, it may be
appropriate to make such an order regardless of whether the
1047
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defendant has done anything wrong, even by consequentialist
standards. An order that an "efficient breacher" of a contract pay
damages is arguably just such an order: The defendant must pay a
sum of money even though his behavior is regarded as praiseworthy
by efficiency theories.27 The defendant may, therefore, be used as an
instrument for furthering the general good. Whatever
consequentialist justification exists for this approach, it is clearly
inconsistent with a rights-based deontological theory.
28
I will limit my inquiries, then, to deontological explanations for
direct enforcement orders and remedial orders.
C. Deontological Accounts of Direct Enforcement Orders
From a deontological perspective, the puzzle posed by direct
enforcement is not so much why courts make such orders but why
they do not make more of them. After all, the content of what a
defendant is required to do by virtue of an order of direct
enforcement is the same as the content of his primary obligation.
Assuming that the state has an interest in primary obligations being
performed, why is it not appropriate for courts to encourage
performance by directly enforcing primary obligations whenever
they are requested to do so? That accommodating such requests may
be costly is not a particularly strong objection in a deontological
account of the law.
The solution to this puzzle turns on the different roles that legal
statements about our primary obligations, and legal orders that
directly enforce primary obligations, are meant to play in citizens'
practical reasoning. From the legal or internal perspective, when
courts or legislatures articulate primary legal obligations they are
articulating legal rules.2 9 By this is meant not just that primary legal
obligations are of general application, directed at all persons living
within a jurisdiction (or at least to all persons of a certain class-
parents, for example-within a jurisdiction). More importantly, it
27. Unless of course the original promise was a disjunctive promise to
perform or pay damages-an implausible interpretation in most cases. I note
also that not all consequentialist accounts support the idea of efficient breach.
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271
(1979).
28. See IMMANUAL KANT, Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, in
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40-54 (M. Gregor trans., 1991).
29. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-91 (1961).
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means that primary legal obligations are presented as statements of
what citizens ought, morally, do as opposed to statements of what it
might be in citizens' self-interest to do. The norms set out in the
primary obligations are meant to be followed, not because of any
sanction that might or might not be attached to them, but because
they describe what citizens morally ought to do. From the legal
perspective, then, the articulation of primary obligations is the
articulation of guidelines for behavior. It is of course understood that
if citizens fail to perform their primary obligations they may be
subject to an order by the courts. But such orders (in whatever form
they may take) are not meant to be the reason that the primary
obligation should be performed. From the law's perspective, it is
intended that the citizen should (if he has not already done so)
internalize these rules, accepting them as not just legally valid but as
normatively valid-as the pronouncements of a valid authority. This
is not to make the implausible claim that all primary obligations are
normatively valid; nor is it to claim that citizens always internalize
primary obligations in the way that the law aspires. The point is
simply that this is how statements about primary obligations are
meant to be regarded.
An order of direct enforcement is quite different. From the
law's perspective it is essentially a command.30 By this I mean not
just that direct enforcement is aimed at a particular individual and
requires that the individual do a specific thing. More fundamentally,
it is a command because the sanction that is necessarily attached to
the order (for example, a charge of contempt of court or the
possibility of goods or money being seized by the sheriff31) is an
integral part of the order. Insofar as a judicial "order" specifying
what the parties ought to do is not accompanied by a sanction for
non-performance, that order is merely declaratory. The difference is
critical. A declaratory order presumes that the parties are willing to
internalize the primary obligations it sets out; the order is required
only because those obligations are unclear. A declaratory order is
effectively a "fine-tuned" articulation of a primary obligation. By
contrast, an order of direct enforcement, which is aimed at a
particular individual and which places the sanction front and center,
30. See id. at 19-20.
31. See ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF
CONTRACT 2 (2d ed. 1994).
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presumes that the defendant is not willing to internalize the relevant
obligation. The sanction is presumed to be the reason for
performance. 3 2 Save in cases where a declaration is sought, why else
would anyone go to court?
From a deontological perspective, this difference between the
messages conveyed by statements of primary obligations and by the
direct enforcement of such obligations suggests the following test for
determining when it is appropriate to directly enforce a primary
obligation. Direct enforcement is appropriate when, but only when,
a citizen is unwilling to accept or internalize a primary obligation.
Aside from whatever general or social value may arise from living in
a community in which those in power attempt to guide behavior
primarily by rules rather than commands, there is a value, from a
deontological aspect, in rule-based over command-driven behavior.
It is important that people act in external conformity with their
primary obligations, but it is also important-intrinsically
important-that they do so for the right reasons. From a
deontological perspective, which focuses on the intrinsic value of
actions, it is important that people honor contracts not just because
they are afraid of what courts will do to them if they do not honor
contracts, but because they think they ought, morally, to honor
contracts. Insofar as courts order direct enforcement, they assume
that citizens are unwilling or incapable of internalizing the relevant
norm, and that they will conform only because of an external threat.
The threat does not, of course, eliminate the possibility of
internalizing the norm, but it sends the wrong message. It tells the
citizen that he is not expected to internalize the norm.
Orders of direct enforcement are thus inconsistent with the law's
desire-a legitimate desire from a deontological perspective-that
the law be treated as a legitimate authority rather than a gunman writ
large. Nonetheless, there remains a role for direct enforcement.
Although there is a value in citizens conforming to their primary
obligations for the right reasons, there is also a value in citizens
outwardly conforming to those obligations. Rights-infringements are
wrong no matter why they happen. This latter value can
appropriately be pursued in those cases in which it is clear that the
former value is of no concern. In practice, this leads to the
32. Of course the granting of direct enforcement orders is itself governed
by rules directed at the judiciary. See HART, supra note 29, at 95-96.
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common-sense conclusion that commanding citizens to perform their
primary obligations by direct enforcement orders is prima facie
appropriate where citizens are unwilling to internalize the relevant
primary obligation.33  Stated differently, direct enforcement is in
principle appropriate precisely in those cases in which it is clear that
it is needed in order to ensure that the relevant primary obligation is
performed.
D. Deontological Accounts of Remedial Orders
An initial observation is that any explanation of remedial orders,
deontological or not, must piggyback onto an explanation of direct
enforcement. A remedial order is not the direct enforcement of a
primary obligation, but it is a sanction-backed order directed to a
specific individual to do a specific thing. A remedial order might
usefully be described as the direct enforcement of a secondary
obligation (the obligation to repair). It follows from what was said
above concerning the prerequisites for direct enforcement that a
prerequisite to granting a remedial order is that the defendant is
unwilling to perform his secondary obligation to repair (assuming
that performance was desired by the plaintiff). I will not say
anything further about this aspect of remedial orders. Although it
may be queried whether this requirement is always properly taken
into account by courts (especially in cases in which the parties
disagree in good faith as to their rights) my interest here is with the
logically prior, and substantively more important issue of when, if
ever, the content of a remedial order-to repair a loss-is something
the defendant ought to do. I will assume that if the parties are in
court then the "unwillingness" requirement is satisfied.
From a deontological perspective, the justification of a duty to
repair (a secondary obligation), must be of a similar kind to the
explanation of primary obligations. It must be grounded in the
intrinsic value of the reparative acts. So far as I am aware, the only
plausible explanation of this kind is a justice-based explanation,
more specifically a corrective justice-based explanation. I will not
33. The qualifier "prima facie" is added to make clear that in certain cases
other considerations, for example personal liberty or difficulties of supervision,
may justify defeating an otherwise valid claim for direct enforcement. I note
that it is not clear, however, that "adequacy of damages" is a relevant factor. I
discuss such considerations briefly in Part III. See infra Part III.
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offer a moral justification for corrective justice, 34 but will assume
that, like the concepts of "rights" and "welfare" used earlier, it
expresses a prima facie morally plausible value. I will therefore limit
myself to explaining what corrective justice means, why it can be
adopted by a deontological theory, and its implications for when
remedial orders should be given.
The concept of "justice" is conventionally understood to
provide, inter alia, a particular type of standard for assessing acts or
omissions.35 To say that an act is "just" is to say, first, that it is
intrinsically valuable (or intrinsically "right" or "good") rather than
merely instrumentally valuable (valuable because of its valuable
consequences). Justice is its own end. This is one reason that
efficiency theories and, more generally, consequentialist moral
theories are not thought to provide theories of justice.36 Second, to
say that an act is just is to say that it is intrinsically valuable because,
in broad terms, one person has rendered to another person what is
fitting or appropriate or "due" to that person. A contrast can again be
drawn with efficiency-based standards, which evaluate actions not in
terms of their rightness vis-a-vis particular individuals but in terms of
their rightness vis-d-vis the amount of welfare they produce in
society generally. In efficiency terms, an award of damages is
valuable if it leads to an increase in overall welfare. By contrast, the
award is just only if the plaintiff was due the sum paid and was due
that sum from the defendant.
Justice takes various forms (e.g., distributive, retributive,
corrective). The particular form of justice that is appropriate to
explaining judicial orders will depend on the nature of the orders
being explained. In respect of private law orders to repair, the
relevant form is corrective justice. Corrective justice is concerned
34. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 25, at 56-83.
35. See id. at 61-63.
36. Insofar as efficiency theories have a theory of "justice" it is that justice
is synonymous with the maximization of welfare. This of course denies any
real content to justice. To say that an act is just, in this view, says nothing
more than that it promotes welfare. The concept of justice has no independent
value. Efficiency theorists might also argue that individuals promote welfare
best when acting out of a sense of (non-consequentialist) justice, and, thus, that
a belief in "justice" is efficient even if it is mistaken. This argument, which is
analogous to one made in respect of "remedies" (described in Part II B above;
see also text accompanying note 15), again denies any real content to justice.
See id. at 66-68.
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with the justice of duties to repair or to rectify harms, and in
particular with duties to repair harms caused by one's wrongful
actions. 37 Corrective justice might thus be described as individual or
personal justice. It can be contrasted with both distributive
justice-the justice of schemes for distributing goods, income, and
other resources-and retributive justice-the justice of punishment.
The general idea underlying the concept of corrective justice is
that we have a duty to repair or "correct" wrongful losses that we
have caused. The losses must be wrongful or else there is nothing to
"correct" -merely a situation that might be improved.39 What
qualifies as "wrongful" is not specified by the concept of corrective
justice itself. Corrective justice is meant to explain duties to repair
(secondary duties) and not duties not to cause wrongful losses
(primary duties). Primary duties must be explained on other
grounds. In a rights-based deontological theory of private law, those
grounds are individual rights; a wrongful loss is a loss that arises
from infringing another's individual rights.
The concept of corrective justice, then, provides an account-
compatible with deontological theories of private law-for when
remedial orders should be made. For the purposes of the question
addressed in this Article, the most significant precondition to the
making of such orders is that a wrong has been committed.
Corrective justice duties are duties to repair losses caused by wrongs.
Although the point is less important for our purposes, it should be
noted that there is nothing in the concept of corrective justice that
determines the form that a remedy should take. There are different
ways of repairing losses. In particular, both orders to do or not do
something and orders to pay a sum of money can in principle satisfy
the requirements of corrective justice. Repair is, in practice,
compensation, and compensation can be in kind or in money.
37. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 177-84 (1980); WEINRIB, supra note 25, at 56-83; Stephen R. Perry,
On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., Oxford University Press,
4th Series 2000) (all discussing the nature of corrective justice).
38. See WEINRIB, supra note 25, at 60.
39. See Perry, supra note 37, at 239 ("Corrective justice gives rise to a duty
to repair when persons have harmed one another.").
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To summarize: From a deontological perspective, an order of
direct enforcement is prima facie appropriate in cases in which it is
clear that the defendant is unwilling to accept or internalize the
relevant primary obligation. A remedial order, by contrast, is
appropriately ordered in cases in which the defendant has wrongfully
caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss (and failed to repair that loss).
The only point to add-an important one as it turns out-is that it is
of course possible that some plaintiffs claims may satisfy both of
these criteria.
III. ARE RESTITUTIONARY ORDERS REMEDIAL ORDERS?
I turn now to consider the question posed in the introduction,
that of whether restitutionary orders should be regarded as remedial
orders or as the direct enforcement of primary duties. Three kinds of
evidence will be examined: (1) the judicial explanation of
restitutionary orders; (2) the content of restitutionary orders; (3) the
preconditions for restitutionary orders.
A. The Judicial Explanation of Restitutionary Orders
In describing the plaintiffs argument in a case of subtractive
unjust enrichment courts rarely make a clear distinction between the
plaintiffs complaint against the defendant and what the plaintiff is
asking the court to do.40 The discussion tends to focus exclusively
on the question of whether the defendant was unjustly enriched.
That said, the language used and the explanations provided by courts
when they make restitutionary orders are undoubtedly more
consistent with the direct enforcement view.41 Although references
to restitutionary damages are sometimes still heard, the more usual
terminology, especially in cases involving subtractive unjust
enrichment, is restitutionary awards. More to the point, the very
word restitution means a "giving back" rather than "compensation
for loss" or anything similar. Consistent with this meaning, when
courts do describe a plaintiffs claim in a case of subtractive unjust
enrichment, it is styled not as a claim for damages or compensation
or repair for any kind of wrong, but rather as a claim for the return or
40. See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548, 560 (H.L.)
(Eng.) (Lord Templeman primarily focuses on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim.).
41. See id. at 578.
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the recovery of benefits that the plaintiff transferred to the
defendant.42 Indeed, the direct enforcement view seems to neatly
explain why courts fail to distinguish between the plaintiffs
complaint about the defendant and the plaintiff's request to the court:
on the direct enforcement view they are two sides of the same coin.
Judicial language and judicial explanations must be given
significant weight in any explanation of the law.43 In the case of
restitutionary orders, they are in my view the strongest reason for
supporting the direct enforcement view. But it would go too far,
particularly in an area of law like restitution, to regard such language
and statements as determinative. The history of restitution, littered
as it is with false understandings, tells us this much. If the judicial
view of restitution were considered the final word, we would still
regard restitutionary orders as founded on implied contracts. One
might add that even defenders of the direct enforcement view
acknowledge that the word "restitution" has been frequently misused
by lawyers and judges.44
B. The Content of Restitutionary Orders
In many cases, the status of a judicial order as remedial or direct
enforcement can be established by the content of the order. For
example, if the primary duty on which the plaintiffs claim is based
is a tort duty not to injure the plaintiff, then an order that the
defendant pay a sum of money to the plaintiff cannot be direct
enforcement. The two duties are transparently different in content.
Where, however, the relevant primary obligation is a monetary
obligation, the content of a judicial order may provide few clues as to
how it should be classified. On such occasions, the content of a
direct enforcement order will be the same as the content of remedial
order-to pay a sum of money to the defendant. This is the case in
respect of most restitutionary orders. The primary obligation in most
cases of subtractive unjust enrichment is an obligation to return
money. Mistaken transfers typically involve mistaken payments.
42. See id. ("The claim for money had and received is not, as I have
previously mentioned, founded upon any wrong committed by the club against
the solicitors.").
43. See Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241,
248-49 (2000).
44. See Peter Birks, Misnomer, in RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 1, 34 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 2000).
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Of course, the amount of money specified by a remedial order
should in principle be different, at least in some cases, from the
amount specified by a direct enforcement order. In principle, a
remedial order should, in at least some cases, include a sum intended
to compensate for consequential losses. That such sums are not
awarded as part of restitutionary orders45 might seem, then, a strong
objection to the remedial view. However, the objection is
transparently weak. Courts add interest awards to restitutionary
orders 46 and such awards can plausibly be regarded as compensation
for consequential losses. The explanation is that, rather than engage
in the administratively and evidentially difficult task of assessing
consequential losses directly, courts have adopted a general rule that
such losses are equivalent to the lost interest. To be sure, interest
awards can also be regarded as a measure of (one aspect of) the
defendant's unjust enrichment, and thus are also consistent with the
direct enforcement view.47 My point is that the amount of money a
defendant must pay in restitutionary claims is consistent with both
views of restitutionary orders. Furthermore, the common law's
historical reticence to award consequential damages with respect to
monetary obligations makes it generally unwise to place much
weight on this feature of restitutionary awards.48
In any event, whatever support the direct enforcement view
might derive from the rule against recovery of consequential losses is
offset by the fact that courts grant monetary awards even in cases
involving the transfer of chattels. Judicial practice here appears to
support the remedial view. I noted earlier that there is no reason to
suppose that a remedial order must always be in money rather than in
kind, but direct enforcement ought to be in kind. In response to this
point, Birks has argued that it is a mistake to assume that the primary
obligation in such cases is to return the chattel.49  But the only
45. "[H]e can be liable no further than the money he has received. . .
Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 679 (K.B. 1760) (Eng.).
46. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 30-31 (1993).
This is not always true (or the case). See Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council, [1996] A.C. 669 (H.L.)
(Eng.).
47. A third possibility is that a single interest award could also be regarded
as a measure of benefit up to the point at which the primary duty was breached
and thereafter as a measure of consequential loss.
48. See BURROWS, supra note 31, at 97-98.
49. B irks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, supra note 2, at 29
1056
Winter 2003] STRUCTURE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
evidence Birks offers in support of this view is that English law says
that plaintiffs in such cases normally do not, in effect, have a right to
the chattel. 50 That is an accurate statement of the plaintiff's rights at
court, but there is no reason to assume it accurately describes the
defendant's primary duty. More to the point, it is simply implausible
as a matter of first principle to suppose that the recipient of a
mistakenly transferred chattel is not under a primary duty to return
that chattel. That is like saying our primary contractual obligation is
to pay a sum of money equal to the value of our promised
performance.
At the same time, just as it would be unwise to place significant
weight on the rule against recovery of consequential losses, it would
also be unwise to place significant weight on the rules that provide
for monetary awards in cases involving chattels. The explanation for
the latter rules regarding chattels seems likely to lie not in a
principled distinction, but in historical limits on the ability of courts
of law to award specific relief. Monetary restitutionary awards can
thus plausibly be regarded as a second-best form of substitute direct
enforcement.
The content of restitutionary orders, then, seems consistent with
both the direct enforcement view and the remedial view. The direct
enforcement view offers the more natural explanation of the rule
against recovery of consequential losses; the remedial view offers the
more natural explanation of the rule providing for monetary awards
in cases involving chattels. In the end, however, both rules are
explicable by both approaches.
C. The Preconditions for Restitutionary Orders
Earlier, in Part II, the preconditions for granting direct
enforcement and remedial orders were described. The question I
consider now is whether either--or both--of these sets of
preconditions are satisfied in cases in which restitutionary orders are
made.
Beginning with the preconditions for a remedial order, the only
issue-an important one-is whether the requirement of a wrong is
satisfied. The requirement of a loss is satisfied automatically if the
(responding to Barker, supra note 2).
50. See id. at 30 ("study of the common counts shows this to be incorrect
for English law.").
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wrong, which is failing to return a benefit, is established. Supporters
of the direct enforcement view have argued that restitution cannot be
a remedy since plaintiffs claiming restitution do not need to prove
that the defendant has committed a wrong. 5 1  In particular, the
plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant wrongly failed to
return the relevant benefit. The plaintiff needs only to establish facts
that show the defendant was and is unjustly enriched. This is an
accurate description of English law, 52 but it provides little support for
the direct enforcement view. The facts that show that a defendant
was and remains unjustly enriched also prove that a wrong has
occurred. The primary obligation in a case of a mistaken transfer is
an obligation to return what was transferred. If the mistaken transfer
is proven and the defendant has not returned the benefit by the time
of trial, then the necessary wrong is established. There is nothing left
to prove when the breach of duty is shown.
53
Moreover, an equivalent objection could in any event be made
against the direct enforcement view. As explained in Part II, the
main precondition for direct enforcement is that the defendant is
unwilling to perform his primary obligation. 54  Yet a plaintiff
claiming restitution is not required to prove that the defendant is
unwilling to perform. If the "no wrong" objection is taken seriously,
then the "no unwillingness to perform" objection must also be taken
seriously-leading to the implausible conclusion that restitutionary
orders are neither direct enforcement nor remedial. But of course the
51. Seeid. at28.
52. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, [1998] 4 All E.R.
513, 542 (H.L.) (Eng.) ("[T]he cause of action for the recovery of money paid
under a mistake of fact accrues at the time of payment.").
53. See id.
54. An additional "precondition" for a direct enforcement order is that it be
possible to perform the primary obligation. It might be argued that it is not in
fact possible for a defendant in a successful claim based on subtractive unjust
enrichment to perform the primary obligation since by definition it is too late
to perform. The benefit should have been returned earlier (on the controversial
question of exactly when the benefit should be returned, see Stephen A. Smith,
Justifying the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEx. L. REv. 2177, 2194-95
(1979)). This suggestion raises complex issues about the concept of an
"obligation" that cannot be explored here. Briefly, however, the response is
that with respect to subtractive unjust enrichment claims, the essence of the
primary duty is the obligation to return the relevant benefit. The timing of the
return is merely a non-essential feature of the obligation. Hence, "late return"
is just that-late return.
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"no unwillingness to perform" objection should be rejected for the
same reason that the "no wrong" objection should be rejected. The
defendant's unwillingness to perform is proven by the facts that
establish that the defendant was and remains unjustly enriched. If
the parties are in court, it goes without saying that the defendant is
unwilling to perform his primary obligation. 5 Here again, there is
nothing left to prove.
I conclude, then, that the preconditions for both direct
enforcement orders and remedial orders are met in cases in which
restitutionary orders are made. This conclusion rebuts the most
important objections to the direct enforcement and the remedial view
respectively. At the same time, it also provides a powerful argument
in support of each view. Let me explain.
Insofar as the preconditions for an order of direct enforcement
are met, then the law would be acting prima facie inconsistently (not
to mention normatively badly) if it refused to grant such an order.
There may, of course, be cases in which a prima facie good claim for
direct enforcement can properly be refused for external reasons.
Orders that involve personal service, raise special supervision
problems, or that might have a chilling effect on freedom of
expression arguably fall into this class. But none of these concerns,
or any others that might be relevant, 56 arise in cases of subtractive
unjust enrichment. The content of an order of direct enforcement in
such cases is straightforward: to pay a sum of money.
5 7
The same point can be made with respect to remedial orders. If
a wrong has occurred, it is legally inconsistent (and normatively
wrong) for the law to refuse a remedy to a plaintiff who seeks one. If
corrective justice is important, then it is important in all cases of
wrongfully caused losses. To be sure, a legal system might decide
that certain wrongs are not serious enough to justify permitting
55. This may not be right since the parties may have a good faith dispute as
to their rights.
56. If it were the case that a court should not order direct enforcement
unless damages are "inadequate" then this might provide a good reason to
refuse direct enforcement. However, it is not clear why adequacy of damages
should be relevant, particularly in a case where the primary obligation is a
simple duty to return a benefit.
57. I am assuming here that, for reasons discussed earlier, a direct
enforcement order in a case involving transferred chattels can properly be
expressed in monetary terms.
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victims to ask courts for remedies. It might further be argued that the
wrong of failing to return property is just such a wrong. As I have
argued elsewhere, the relevant duty here-the duty to return
58property-is a positive duty to assist another person. For good
moral reasons, the law does not normally enforce duties to benefit
others. Such a duty, though normally only a trivial burden, is prima
facie inconsistent with the principle-the harm principle-that legal
constraints on liberty are justifiable only to the extent they are
required in order to prevent harm to others. 59 On these grounds, it
might be argued that while one morally ought to return property that
one has received by, say, mistake, a failure to do so should not give
rise to legal liability. Supporters of the direct enforcement view
appear to believe something along these lines.
The difficulty with this argument is that it cuts both ways. If a
duty to return property is not capable of supporting a claim for
reparation, then it is not clear why it is capable of supporting an
order of direct enforcement. If anything, the opposite conclusion
seems more plausible. It is usually assumed that remedial orders
should be granted more easily than direct enforcement orders on the
grounds that they are less intrusive.60 It is possible, I suppose, that
just as a prima facie good claim for direct enforcement can
sometimes be defeated by "external" considerations that do not apply
to a claim for a remedy, a prima facie good claim for a remedy can
sometimes be defeated by external considerations that do not apply
to a claim for direct enforcement. Yet, the law provides no clear
examples of such circumstances, and it is difficult to imagine what
they would be. In every case in which injunctive or specific relief-
which I will assume are instances of direct enforcement-is available
for the breach of a non-monetary obligation,6 1 compensatory
damages are also available if a loss has been caused by a breach of
the relevant primary duty.62 It is only where a breach has not yet
happened that a remedy is unavailable.
58. See Smith, supra note 54, at 2181-82.
59. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955)
(1859).
60. Though with respect to monetary obligations, this is not a good
argument.
61. I leave to the side cases involving monetary obligations because it is the
status of such cases that is the issue.
62. See DOBBS, supra note 11, at 6.
1060
Winter 2003] STRUCTURE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Finally, the similar content of direct enforcement orders and
remedial orders is not itself a reason for refusing a remedial order.
Assuming that the preconditions for a remedial order are satisfied, a
remedial order should be available. Of course, if an order of direct
enforcement has already been made by a court, then it would be
inappropriate to also order a remedy.63 If the primary duty is
performed, there is no loss to remedy. But this does not explain why
a court should refuse a remedy in the first place. Moreover, insofar
as this is an argument in favor of the direct enforcement view, it is
also an argument in favor of the remedial view. It could equally be
argued that courts should refuse direct enforcement orders because
they give remedial orders, and, in practice, such orders give plaintiffs
what they would get from direct enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION: A DUAL ROLE FOR RESTITUTIONARY ORDERS
The above analysis establishes that restitutionary orders can
plausibly be explained as either direct enforcement orders or
remedial orders. It also establishes that courts would be acting
inconsistently-and normatively wrongly-if they refused a request
to make either kind of order in the types of cases in which
restitutionary orders are made.
On the assumption that a single restitutionary order cannot be
both remedy and direct enforcement, the conclusion to draw from the
foregoing seems clear: Restitutionary orders can be direct
enforcement orders or remedial orders. Sometimes they will be the
former, sometimes the latter. The classification of any particular
restitutionary order depends on whether the court is responding to a
request for a remedy or a request for direct enforcement.
The language that courts have used in past cases involving
subtractive unjust enrichment suggests that most of the orders made
in past cases were direct enforcement orders. This finding is
consistent with the "dual role view." This view allows for different
mixtures of direct enforcement and remedial orders. It even allows
for the possibility that every past restitutionary order was a direct
enforcement order. The dual role view does not require that
plaintiffs sometimes request remedies and sometimes request direct
63. See id. at 3.
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enforcement. All it requires is that they be understood to have the
option of making either request.
